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The ACC is currently funded on a pay-as-you-go (pay-go) basis. This means that
levies on participants in the scheme cover only its current period operating costs. In
the past, these costs have been lower than the amount required to fully fund the cost
of the new claims being added to the ACC each year. This has created a $7.5 billion
unfunded liability that the government must address as part of any long term reform
of the ACC.
The introduction of competitive private delivery of the Employers’ Account of the
ACC requires that all future participation by employers be on a fully funded premium
basis. What should the government do with the unfunded liability of the Employers’
Account at the time that competition is introduced? This paper argues that if the
government wants to create an efficient accident compensation market for employers,
it should not levy current employers for this unfunded liability. The government
should not in any way entangle the funding of past liabilities with the operation of the
ongoing competitive market.
2. Pay-go vs Full Funding and the Unfunded Liability
2.1 Alternative Funding Arrangements
We can distinguish conceptually between three different approaches to funding social
welfare, superannuation and insurance schemes.
• Full funding: Premiums are set at a level that will fully fund all expected
liabilities associated with the claims arising from accidents in the period
covered by the premium. This means that premiums levied for insurance
coverage in year j will provide a pool of funds that has, at the prevailing market
interest rates, a present value equivalent to the present value of the expected
future payments that will be made in respect of these new claims incurred in
year j. It also implies that if an insurance scheme operating on such a basis for k
3years were to cease operations at the end of year k, it would have a pool of
funds sufficient to meet the expected costs of claims incurred in years 1 to k
even though some of those claims might continue for many years into the future
beyond k.
• Pay-go funding: Current and future premium rates are set at levels that will
meet the annual cost of the payments made by the scheme, regardless of the
year in which the accident upon which each claim is based occurred. Pay-go
funding requires that the premiums set for year j must be equivalent to the
expected value of payments made in respect of new claims arising in year j,
plus the expected value of payments made in year j in respect of claims
originating from earlier years 1 to j – 1. A key feature of a pay-go scheme is
that it requires compulsion and the ability to tax. The ability to tax ensures that
individuals can be required to meet the current period costs of the scheme even
if this establishes a premium rate that is greater than the expected value of the
current period insurance benefits received.
• Partial funding: Premium rates are set at levels that provide less than the full
present value of liabilities arising from the claims made in the current period,
but sufficient to fund some of the future liabilities arising from these claims.
Partial funding can be viewed as the provision of a capital sum the investment
income from which offsets a full pay-go premium to some degree.
It is also necessary to distinguish between the aggregate funding of ACC schemes and
the premiums that individuals pay. If premiums are set so that in aggregate they cover
the current and future liability for new claims, then the scheme is fully funded. This
only happens in two instances:
• Schemes in which individuals pay actuarially fair premiums. This implies full
funding.
• If individuals do not face actuarially fair premiums, then the scheme will have to
be cross subsidised between groups of individuals. The cross-subsidisation results
in actuarially fair premiums in aggregate. As with pay-go schemes, explicit cross-
subsidisation will require compulsory participation; otherwise only those who
expect to receive a subsidy will participate.
4It is important to note that:
• pure pay-go funding does not have actuarially fair premiums, even in the
aggregate. Our use of the term “fully funded” means fully funded in the aggregate
unless otherwise indicated.
• there would be negligible difference between funding methods if all accident
costs occurred in the first year only. In fact, for most accidents this is the case, but
there is a significant number of costly claims that run off over long periods.
• The credibility and efficiency of a fully funded scheme is difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve unless the scheme is privatised. History in New Zealand
and elsewhere implies that the investment capital of government fully funded
schemes will be used for purposes other than funding claims.
2.2 Implications of Funding Arrangements on the Unfunded Liability
Each of the approaches to funding outlined in section 2.1 may provide a basis for a
stable scheme and solvency, but the choice between them will have extremely
important implications for the efficiency with which the scheme operates.
In schemes such as the ACC, liabilities arising from claims may continue for many
years. This means that a large proportion of the payments made by the ACC each year
are in respect of claims made in earlier years. The cost of a representative individual’s
claim is therefore the annualised value of the payments made, multiplied by the
expected duration of the claim. For the ACC scheme as a whole, the average duration
of claims is a key determinant of total costs, and thus of the assets required to fully
fund claims. Small changes in average claim duration can have a substantial impact
on the present value of the liabilities of such a scheme.
Under pay-go or partial funding, the scheme will have unfunded liability (assets
whose present value is less than the expected future cost of existing claims). The
existence of this liability will have important political and efficiency implications.
The political implications arise from the fact that the unfunded liability may grow so
large as to raise concerns about the willingness of government to impose, and the
5electorate to tolerate, the tax rates that would be required to fund it if the scheme
should be closed down. The efficiency implications arise from the fact that in the
period before a pay-go scheme matures, the accumulation of unfunded liability in the
scheme results from past participants in the scheme having received benefit levels
that were in excess of those that could be provided (on a fully funded basis) from the
premiums that they paid.
2.3 Magnitude of the Unfunded Liability.
The key trends in the unfunded liability of the ACC Scheme are set out in Table 1. Of
particular importance is the fact that at the present time, the unfunded liability in the
Employers’ Account is in effect being reduced by a levy on existing employers. This
is because the premiums for the Employers’ Account are substantially in excess of
those required to meet the current year’s cost of claims. The efficiency of this
approach in dealing with the unfunded liability in the ACC scheme is commented on
below.
Table 1
3. Efficiency: The Requirement for Full Funding.
Estimates of the Unfunded Liability in the ACC
1995 1996 1997 1998
$6.5 billion $7.4 billion $7.3 billion   $7.5 billion
Key Trends
• Recent reduction in new claims in the Employers’ Account, but premiums kept
high
• fall in the unfunded liability in the employers account.
• Unfunded liability in the other accounts is increasing
• ACC claims that more effective management of the tail of claims is being
provided
 as yet no statistically convincing evidence that this is actually impacting
on the unfunded liability
Overall, the total unfunded liability in the ACC is increasing more slowly than was
implied by the 1995 to 1996 estimates.
6The different alternatives to funding will have distinct implications for efficiency,
because efficiency requires that individuals and firms face actuarially fair premiums.1
Actuarially fair premiums are those premiums that equate to the present value of
expected benefits plus insurance-management costs and profits set in a competitive
market. There will entail some cross subsidisation within risk pools that are designed
to efficiently separate agents into different risk classes. It will not be possible, or
efficient, to separate at the individual or firm level.
Only under special conditions will the premiums set in pay-go schemes be actuarially
fair (ie equal to full funding premiums). It follows, therefore, that pay-go schemes
will rarely give us the efficient outcome. Let us explain this further.
3.1 Actuarially Fair Premiums : Compulsion and Taxation
The premiums of pay-go accident insurance schemes do not in general equal the
present value of expected benefits and hence they are not actuarially fair. Because
premiums that are not actuarially fair are inherent to pay-go schemes, participation in
these schemes is necessarily compulsory and relies on the ability to tax. This is why
they are government schemes. 2 Because they are government schemes their assets
and liabilities are the property of government.
The setting of actuarially fair premiums results in fully funding the scheme in the
aggregate, and eliminates intra- and inter-cohort cross subsidisation.  When this is not
done, full funding eliminates inter-cohort transfers only. (See Section 3.2)
3.2 Cross –Subsidisation and Intergenerational Problems
                                                
1 This is because in the absence of significant externalities among insurers and the insured,
efficient contracts will be those where individuals purchase insurance to the point that their
expected welfare from the last unit of insurance equals the cost to society of its provisions. This
cost is the actuarially fair value of the insurance plus some competitively determined insurance
delivery margin. (It is presumed that it is most efficient to conduct re-distribution through the
taxation system.)
2 Full funding in the aggregate without premiums for individuals that are actuarially fair also
requirescompulsion.
7In a pay-go scheme there are two broad methods of cross subsidisation which impair
the link between the premium an individual pays, and the benefits they receive.
Inefficiency occurs through transfers between different age cohorts. Even given a
stable demographic structure and accident exposure, the transition to a steady state in
a pay-go scheme will provide certain cohorts with benefits at the expense of others.
For example, upon the introduction of a pay-go scheme the premiums may be lower
for a given level of benefits, but will grow as the scheme matures and its cost
increases approach a steady state. This entails a transfer from future to present age
cohorts. Indeed, inter-cohort transfers can take place in a steady state if cohorts of the
insureds have different proclivities for risk that are not reflected in the premiums or
benefits. In addition to equity considerations, these transfers are inefficient to the
extent that the cohorts that are subsidised consume more insurance than they would if
they were not subsidised.
Pay-go schemes are based on an implicit inter-cohort contract. As in Samuelson
(1958) each cohort pays for the costs of the benefits received by the previous cohort
on the assumption that the next cohort will do the same for them. In effect, therefore,
each cohort meets the current costs of ACC benefit payments on the assumption that
the costs of their claims will be funded by pay-go premiums levied on a future cohort.
Again this is why pay-go requires government mandated compulsion and the ability
to tax.
Intergenerational equity can also require that each generation bear the same expected
(ex ante) costs and receive the same expected benefits. In the ACC scheme this may
be defined by the intergenerational constancy of benefit and premium rates as a
proportion of income. Ex ante intergenerational transfers within the scheme
(differences in expected benefits and / or premium growth rates) will threaten the
sustainability of the scheme by removing the perception of equity that is central to the
enforcement of the implicit contract between cohorts.
Pay-go schemes typically embody transfers within cohorts by using the terms of the
scheme to transfer expected benefits of higher premium contributors to those who
8contribute less. Any such transfers reduce the efficiency of both pay-go schemes and
schemes that are fully funded in the aggregate but in which individuals are not
assessed actuarially fair premiums. They are not present in fully funded schemes
except to the extent of normal insurance risk pooling.
The transfer of wealth (which is present in pay-go schemes) between participants not
only within the scheme, but also between present and past participants, weakens the
vital link between individuals’ premiums and benefits. The weaker this link, the more
the premium will be regarded as a general tax that simply contributes to a
consolidated fund, and the larger the consequent economic inefficiency. This source
of inefficiency will be of less significance in schemes that are fully funded in the
aggregate.
3.3 The Importance of the Interest Rate
In a steady state pay-go scheme with no cross-subsidisation, premiums can be
identical to those associated with an equivalent fully funded scheme only if the real
interest rate is equal to the population growth rate.
Expenditure and hence the premium rate in a pay-go scheme is determined by past
claims and the first-year costs of claims. It is not directly influenced by the interest
rate. However, it is affected by the population growth rate. All other things being
constant, the premium income relative to liability for claims incurred in the past,
grows by the population growth rate. That is, under pay-go the larger population of
today meets claims incurred in the past when the population and its concomitant
claims were lower.
In contrast, the full-funding premium rate is directly determined by the interest rate.
For any given level of income, an increase in the interest rate will leave the pay-go
premium rate unchanged but will reduce the full-funding premium rate. This effect
9occurs because some of the premium income of fully funded schemes will be invested
until paid out in benefits in future periods.3
For real interest rates that exceed the population growth rate, the income obtained
from these invested funds will ensure that steady-state fully funded schemes have
lower aggregate premiums than pay-go schemes with the same benefits. The longer
the period over which accident victims may claim benefits, the larger will be the
impact on premiums that results from the compound interest return on funds invested.
It has generally been the case that the real interest rate exceeds the population growth
rate and this is expected to continue. This ensures that even in the steady state, a pay-
go scheme may not provide actuarially fair premiums.4
4. Who should pay the Unfunded Liability?
4.1 Considerations
There are two components of the unfunded liability of the ACC: the liability incurred
for existing claims that will run off in the future, and the unfunded liability arising
from future claims made while the ACC continues to operate as a pay-go scheme
under current terms and conditions. Both types of liability can be funded by some
combination of capital sums placed to the credit of ACC and higher levels of
premiums and changed benefits now or in the future. Unfunded liability is an inherent
part of the ex ante design of a pay-go scheme and as such does not present funding
problems which need to be resolved.5
                                                
3 There is a growing literature (see Feldstein (1995) and Feldstein and Samwick (1996) and
Kotlikoff (1996)) suggesting that there are very significant economic efficiency gains to be made
when switching from pay-go to fully funded superannuation schemes. The gains arise from: (a)
compounding at the marginal product of capital rather than the rate of growth of the economy;
and (b) more tightly aligning expected benefits with contributions.  Both these points are
applicable to accident compensation schemes.
4 It is conceptually possible for a pay-go scheme to be undone or partially undone by the actions of
individuals and converted to a fully (or partially) funded scheme. This occurs when individuals
invest the present value of expected claims costs and regard the concomitant interest earnings as
offsetting the pay-go premium. Whether or not there are extra transactions costs entailed in such
actions, there will be no efficiency advantage over a purely fully funded scheme.
5 This statement refers only to the issue of funding the liability. The stable pay-go funding basis
will still raise the issues of the actuarial fairness and efficiency of the premiums discussed
elsewhere in this paper.
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The size of the unfunded liability depends to a large extent on the duration profile of
claims. The efficient management of these claims requires providing the contractual
benefits of the claimants at least cost. Management can be separated from funding,
and in this discussion it is assumed that the appropriate institutional arrangements are
put in place for efficient management to occur.
Given efficient management of claims, the unfunded liability associated with the
existing claims of a pay-go scheme is, in economic terms, “sunk.” It is an
unavoidable fixed cost that has been incurred from the past operation of the business.
Current and future ACC premiums and benefits will affect decision making and hence
influence the efficiency of the accident insurance and related markets, but past
premiums and benefits will not. The only efficiency consideration flowing from
immutable commitments resulting from past decisions and events is - what is the
efficient way to fund them?
Unfunded liability is a significant problem when there is either:
(a) a decision to switch to full funding in the aggregate; or
(b) a solvency problem arising from a situation where current and prospective
premium income will not cover the expected future costs of ongoing past claims
and new claims incurred.
In this connection, note that a pay-go scheme takes a long time to mature, and that
over the build up the premium income of pay-go will be less than that of a fully
funded scheme.
The choice between different approaches to funding needs to be considered on
grounds of efficiency, equity and credibility, and in the light of an economic analysis
of the nature of the unfunded liability. Efficiency considerations must include the
effects of different sources of funds as well as the potential for different approaches to
funding to influence the behaviour of the individuals and firms covered by the
insurance contract itself. Credibility means that participants in the scheme must
believe that funding arrangements are such as to provide the assurance that the
current benefit levels can be maintained. Given the present economic and
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demographic fundamentals, it is at least open to question whether the ACC scheme
can continue to provide the current level of benefits on a pay-go basis.
Questions about sustainability are intertwined with two important intergenerational
(age cohort) issues, as discussed in section 3.2 and suggest that one generation may
be forced to bear the costs of restructuring or abolishing the scheme. This generation
may have to meet the costs of ongoing claims from the past and, in addition, fully
fund the expected present value of their own claims. This need to fully fund the cost
of new claims may arise from a restructuring of the funding basis of the ACC, or
from the abolition of the ACC and the consequent need to purchase coverage from the
private sector. Hence, analysis must be focused on identifying the most efficient
means of paying the unfunded liability in respect of past claims.
4.2 Options
The introduction of competition will require that the Employers’ Account be put on a
fully funded basis. The options for doing this include:
1. Levying surviving past participants in the scheme for a pro rata share of the
liability.
For it to be efficient to levy past participants in the ACC scheme for a share of the
unfunded liability it is necessary that:
• those individuals who have participated in the scheme in the past at pay-go
premium rates less than those required to fully fund the liabilities accumulated
each year have anticipated their ultimate liability to fully fund the scheme and
invested the necessary funds to provide for this contingency;
• those individuals and firms who have participated in the scheme in the past are
able to be identified and levied to the appropriate extent;
• the efficiency loss of the loading on the premiums to meet the unfunded
liabilities is less than that of funding by general taxation.
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2. Levying current participants in the scheme, as was done in the State of
Victoria.
The unfunded liability of the Victorian WorkCare Scheme that existed up to 1992
was funded by a levy on employers from the time that the policy of fully funding
WorkCover was adopted. There are two features of the Victorian scheme which are
crucial to the funding solution adopted and which do not apply to New Zealand.
WorkCover incorporated structural differences from WorkCare that were perceived
by employers as being advantageous to them in the long run, including the prospect
of the ultimate privatisation of the scheme once it was established on a fully funded
basis. This meant that employers were prepared to bear the short-term costs
associated with fully funding the liability for existing claims and the ramp to full-
funding premiums for new business because they anticipated the lower premiums in
the future.6 The political acceptability of this solution should not, however, be
confused with questions of efficiency in the funding of the existing liability. Second,
the Victorian tax base placed constraints on the feasible set of solutions that do not
apply in New Zealand.7
3. Fund the liability from a broad based tax
In our view there are no efficiency gains to be obtained from attempting to impose
liability on past participants, and there are considerable costs associated with levying
current participants in the scheme. Funding the liability from the most broad based
tax is the most efficient solution to the treatment of the liability. To establish this
claim, consider the following five propositions:
Proposition #1: There are large transactions costs associated with levying past
participants.
                                                
6 At the beginning of 1992 WorkCare charged average premiums of 3% of payroll, whereas the
1996 premiums for WorkCover are less than 2%.
7 Because the Victorian Government lacked any income or sales tax, its choices were limited to
increasing accident compensation premiums or increasing the rates associated with even more
narrowly based (and therefore inefficient) taxes.
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Levying past participants will require that the period of coverage for each individual
and firm is established. This will require a very large investment in administration
time. We are not even aware (but are doubtful) that it is feasible to identify in this
way past participants in the ACC. Even assuming that identifying past participants is
feasible, the collection of the levies would also require administrative effort, since
many firms and individuals would not have liquid funds available to pay their share
of the levy (even assuming that they had accumulated savings commensurate with the
difference between full funding premiums and the premiums that they actually paid in
the past) and some payment schedule would need to be negotiated. We believe that
these costs would be very high.
Proposition # 2: It will not be possible to identify and levy many past
participants
Many individuals and firms who participated in the ACC in the past will have died,
emigrated or been wound up, so that it will not be possible to levy them for their
share of the accumulated liability. One possibility will be to apportion their share of
the liability among those past participants who can be identified, but the economic
effects of this will be perverse. To levy surviving firms to cover the obligations of
those (presumably unsuccessful firms) who have been wound up effectively translates
the levy for unfunded liability into an efficiency tax. Alternatively, the share of the
unfunded liability associated with past participants who cannot be traced must be
levied on the current and future cohorts of ACC participants or on taxpayers more
generally.
Proposition #3: It will be difficult to decide what levy to place on past
participants
Any levy of past participants in the ACC will require the calculation of the full
funding rate for the coverage they obtained, less the premiums that were actually
paid, for each year of coverage. Calculation of these rates will be far from
14
straightforward. First, it is arguable whether the rates should be calculated on the
basis of the benefits provided today, or the benefits provided in the year in which the
participation occurred. While the latter might seem appropriate, assuming that
subsequent benefit changes are endogenous to the operation of the scheme would
provide a basis for the claim that current coverage is the appropriate basis for this
calculation. Second, there are no formal actuarial estimates of full funding rates for
coverage in years before 1994, and even those for the period 1994 - 1996 are so
different as to make clear the difficulties of these calculations.
Proposition #4: Equity does not require that past participants meet the cost of
the unfunded liability
It might be argued that treating the unfunded liability of the ACC as a sunk cost is
inequitable because it will result in the write-off of the obligations of:
(a) past generations who paid low premium rates while the scheme was maturing, and
(b) past participants who have imposed the highest levels of claims on the ACC.
Government management of equity considerations takes a variety of forms, mostly
through taxation and social welfare programmes. These entail ex-ante specified
arrangements and rules that have been put in place for the purpose of achieving
redistributive goals. The terms and conditions of ACC constituted just part of these
arrangements. The fact that these economy-wide arrangements for the redistribution
of income are in place at the time individuals make decisions is critically important
for the efficient functioning of the economy. Ex post, retrospective actions will
reduce the credibility of government arrangements and thereby adversely affect the
operation of the economy. They should simply be avoided.
To retrospectively target past premium payers for the payment of claims incurred in
the past, would violate the past pay-go insurance contracts. First, the ACC contract
involves the payment of a (compulsory) premium in return for coverage over a
defined period. The future costs of any claims arising from that period of coverage
are explicitly to be covered by premiums paid by future participants. There is no basis
on which it could be claimed that the future liabilities for the existing claims of a pay-
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go scheme are implicitly or explicitly assigned to the participants in the period in
which the claim arose. When individuals emigrate, and when firms are wound up,
they do so without any need to provide contingencies for future ACC premiums that
they will not pay. Second, the higher risk of any individual past participants in the
scheme could have been recognised in the premiums that they paid if it was efficient
to have them recognise this higher level of risk to the ACC and take increased care.
No ex post adjustment of those premiums from the past can induce them to undertake
more care in the past - all of those actions have already been taken.
Proposition #5: Efficiency does not require that past participants fund the cost of
the unfunded liability
The adoption of a full funding regime for the ACC will, under conditions of
competition, result in participants paying actuarially fair premiums for the coverage
that they receive. The efficiency of this regime flows in part from the link between
the insurance contract and the actions of the insured party over the period for which
the insurance is purchased. If these conditions are achieved, no improvement in the
efficiency of current insurance contracts can be obtained by levying participants for
unfunded liabilities from the past.
With an instantaneous switch the premiums for full funding will fully reflect the
present value of the expected claims and the scheme will be self-funding. Provided
that these premiums are at their efficient level given the no-fault and other safety-
modifying institutions, it will not be efficient to fund the outstanding liability of
existing claims with higher premiums for current participants or levies on past
participants.8 Because this argument is valid with respect to each individual account
in the ACC, there is no basis in efficiency for funding the liability for existing claims
by any means other than the most broadly based tax.
5. Conclusion
                                                
8 The only case for such funding would be if premiums were not high enough to properly modify
risk exposure in the New Zealand environment. However, we know of no evidence that would
justify other than a self-funding scheme.
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Efficiency requires that
• The unfunded liability associated with all ACC accounts be treated as a sunk
cost. Even were it possible to identify the beneficiaries of past low premium
rates it would be inefficient to have the unfunded liability influence future
decision-making.
• The government fund the unfunded liability for existing claims from the
broadest possible tax base.
Funding the unfunded liability through government debt will create a large capital
sum for investment, and the institutional structure within which these funds are
managed is likely to influence the investment performance. Our review of the
literature on management of public superannuation schemes in the US and Canada
suggests that there is widespread support among economists and policy advisors for
disaggregated and private sector management of funds (Canada, 1996, p. 30). This
means that in practice it is likely to be efficient for the government to sell to the
private sector the pool of existing (and fully funded) claims.
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